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INTRODUCTION
Information and know-how are crucial for businesses in developing and maintaining a competitive advantage in today’s economy.1 The important role of trade secrets has grown over the past
few decades with the emergence of the global information society.2
Intellectual property and other intangible assets account for as
much as 75% of most organizations’ value and sources of revenue.3
Trade secrets are unique among intellectual property rights because they are highly pervasive and relevant for virtually all businesses; businesses frequently use trade secrets regardless of their
industry or size, and trade secrets are crucial for maintaining competitive advantages.4 Each year, trade secret theft costs multinational companies billions of dollars.5 However, the exact cost of
trade secret theft for US companies is uncertain because many of
the victims do not become aware of the crime until years later.6
Additionally, companies may not report the theft or intrusion because announcing a breach could tarnish a company’s reputation
and endanger its business relationships.7 The increase in technology use—both by companies and the actors responsible for stealing
trade secrets—is one factor contributing to the exponential increase in trade secret litigation that has occurred over the past few
decades.8 Additionally, “[t]he storage of data overseas ‘has made

1

LORENZO DE MARTINIS ET AL., STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL
BUSINESS INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 1 (Apr. 2013), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_finalstudy_en.pdf.
2
See id.; see also CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE, TRADE SECRET
THEFT: MANAGING THE GROWING THREAT IN SUPPLY CHAINS 1 (2012) (“Over the past
30 years, international trade has increased more than sevenfold and represents a third of
all global economic activity.”).
3
Trends in Proprietary Information Loss, ASIS International, 37 (Aug. 2007),
http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf.
4
de Martinis et al., supra note 1, at 1.
5
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE, supra note 2, at 1.
6
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE 3 (2011) [hereinafter ONCIX], available at
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_20
11.pdf.
7
Id.
8
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE, supra note 2, at 6.
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intellectual capital theft more prevalent and prosecution much
more difficult.’”9
A priority of the United States government is addressing the
theft and transfer of innovative technology trade secrets overseas.10
According to the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator (“IPEC”),11 trade secret theft and economic espionage against corporations based in the United States is accelerating.12 The foreign competitors of these corporations are recruiting
current and former employees of United States corporations to
steal trade secret information and some of these competitors have
ties to foreign governments.13 Trade secret theft through cyber intrusion is affecting law firms, academia, and financial institutions in
addition to United States corporations.14 The United States government is going to continue to apply diplomatic pressure on foreign governments to discourage trade secret theft and to encourage
them to strengthen their enforcement against trade secret theft.15
As a trade policy tool, IPEC enlists the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) to help promote international enforcement against trade secret theft in order to prevent unfair competition against United States companies.16 Every year, the USTR
9

Id. at 6 (quoting MCAFEE, UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES: INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
SENSITIVE CORPORATE DATA NOW THE LATEST CYBERCRIME CURRENCY 5 (2011),
available at http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Cyber/Documents/rp-under
ground-economies.pdf.
10
U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC
PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 9 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategicplan.pdf.
11
IPEC coordinates the work of the Federal government to prevent intellectual
property theft. To accomplish this, IPEC works with “relevant Federal agencies, law
enforcement organizations, foreign governments, private companies, public interest
groups, and others to develop and implement the best strategies” to combat intellectual
property theft. IPEC, About IPEC, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/intellectual
property/ipec (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
12
U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, ADMINISTRATION
STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigat
ing_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 3.
16
Id. at 4.

AND
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conducts a review of the intellectual property rights and state of
intellectual property enforcement in trading partners around the
world.17 The “Special 301” Report is published annually, reflecting
the findings of the USTR’s review.18 The 2014 Special 301 Report
again emphasized the need to protect trade secrets because the
theft and other forms of economic espionage appear to be escalating.19 In particular, the report reflected the United States’ concern
with the growth of trade secret theft in China and China’s gaps in
trade secret protection and enforcement.20 The Special 301 Report
stressed the difficulty of obtaining remedies for trade secret misappropriation under Chinese Law.21
The United States government is becoming increasingly concerned with trade secret theft occurring in China.22 According to a
2011 report to Congress on foreign economic collection and industrial espionage prepared by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (“ONCIX”), “Chinese actors are the world’s
most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.”23
There has been a barrage of computer network intrusions originating in China.24 Although cybersecurity specialists and other American private-sector firms reported these intrusions, the intelligence
community has been unable to confirm who is responsible for the
attacks.25 Mandiant, an independent security firm, reported in
2010 that during the course of a business negotiation where a US
17

AMBASSADOR MICHAEL B.G. FROMAN, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 6 (2014), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Report%2
0to%20Congress%20FINAL.pdf.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 16 (“The theft of trade secrets and other forms of economic espionage, which
imposes significant costs on US companies and threatens the security of the United
States, appears to be escalating.”).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See FROMAN, supra note 17 and accompanying text. China has been on the 301
Special Report Priority Watch List every year since 2005. See INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ALLIANCE, CHART OF COUNTRIES’ SPECIAL 301 PLACEMENT (1989-2013) AND IIPA 2014
SPECIAL 301 RECOMMENDATIONS (2014), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/
2014SPEC301HISTORICALCHART.pdf.
23
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, supra note 6, at i.
24
Id.
25
Id.
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Fortune 500 manufacturing company was seeking to acquire a Chinese firm, information was stolen from the company’s corporate
servers.26 The US company lost sensitive data on a weekly basis
and this may have helped the Chinese firm attain a better position
in the negotiations.27 Mandiant concluded that “‘The Chinese
government may authorize this activity, but there’s no way to determine the extent of its involvement.’”28
In February of 2013, Mandiant published a follow up report in
which they changed their assessment and concluded that “the
groups conducting these activities are based primarily in China and
that the Chinese Government is aware of them.”29 According to
the report, the Advance Persistent Threat, which Mandiant refers
to as APT1, is likely a Chinese government-sponsored actor and a
unit of the People’s Liberation Army known as Unit 61398 or the
Second Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department’s Third Department.30 The report also identifies the persona “Ugly Gorilla” as a hacker in the unit and concludes that the
person behind the persona is a man named Wang Dong.31 The report “details efforts by an arm of the People’s Liberation Army
starting in 2006 to systematically infiltrate 141 companies in over
twenty major industries, including 115 US companies.”32 Hundreds of terabytes of data, including all forms of trade secrets, were
stolen from these US companies.33
In May 2014, the United States charged state actors with economic espionage for hacking into computers and stealing trade se-

26

Id. at 5.
Id.
28
MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 2 (2013),
available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (citing
MANDIANT, M-TRENDS 2 (2010), available at https://dl.mandiant.com/ee/assets/
pdf_mtrends_2010.pdf.).
29
MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 2 (2013).
30
Id. at 2–3.
31
Id. at 52, 55.
32
FROMAN, supra note 17, at 33 (“The industries targeted have been listed as
‘strategic,’ emerging industries that need to be fostered and encouraged as part of
China’s 12th Five Year Plan.”).
33
Id. at 13.
27
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crets for the first time.34 Five Chinese military hackers were indicted by a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania on
thirty-one counts, including economic espionage, trade secret
theft, computer hacking, and other offenses against Westinghouse
Electric Co., United States subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG (“SolarWorld”), United States Steel Corp (“US Steel”), Allegheny
Technologies Inc. (“ATI”), the United Steel, Paper and Forestry,
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service
Workers International Union (“USW”), and Alcoa Inc.35 These
intrusions began as early as 2006 and in some of the cases, the information would have been particularly beneficial to Chinese companies at the time it was stolen.36 One of the five defendants named
in the indictment is Wang Dong a.k.a. “UglyGorilla.”37 He and the
other defendants worked for the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff, Third Department in Unit 61398.38 The defendants sent
“spearphishing”39 messages to trick the recipients into giving them
access to their computers.40 Once the defendants had a foothold in
a computer, they “performed a variety of functions designed to
identify, collect, package, and exfiltrate targeted data.”41 However,
it is unlikely that any of the defendants will actually face trial because China does not have an extradition treaty with the United
34

Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military
Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for
Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html.
35
Indictment ¶¶ 5, 6(a)–6(f), 46, 55, 57, United States v. Dong, Crim. No. 14-118
(W.D. Pa. filed May 19, 2014). The indictment explains the particular intrusions and the
events leading up to the intrusions against the six victims in further detail, with most of
the victims having significant business interests relating to China. Id. ¶¶ 19-42.
36
Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
37
Id. ¶ 5.
38
Id. The hacker Wang Dong a.k.a. “UglyGorilla” and Unit 61398 were mentioned in
the 2013 Mandiant Report, which supports Mandiant’s conclusion that this group was
responsible for other cyber intrusions and that the Chinese government is aware of them.
See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
39
Spearphishing messages are designed to look like email messages from colleagues
and other trustworthy senders and encourage the recipient to open an attachment or click
on a link. These attachments and links are also disguised. However, once the attachment
or link is opened, malware is installed in the computer, which creates a backdoor
providing access to the recipient’s computer. Indictment, supra note 35, ¶ 11.
40
Id.
41
Id. ¶ 18.
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States.42 Consequently, trade secret owners must be afforded viable enforcement options in China.
The Chinese government was also implicated in a civil suit that
settled in 2012.43 Cybersitter LLC settled a $2.2 billion civil suit for
an undisclosed amount.44 The suit alleged that several computer
makers colluded with the Chinese government to develop webfiltering software using code that was stolen from Cybersitter.45
According to Cybersitter, the software that was allegedly stolen
was the first filtering software to block both pornographic and violent online content.46 Researchers at the University of Michigan
determined that the Green Dam program, which was part of a plan
announced by the Chinese government to filter pornographic, violent, and political content on computers within China, copied
roughly 3,000 lines of code from Cybersitter’s software.47 A group
of the Chinese companies involved filed motions to dismiss for a
lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and for failure
to join a necessary and indispensable party, but all of the motions
were denied.48 Default judgment was entered against the Chinese
government because it did not appear and was not immune under
the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.49 Interestingly, one of the defendants in the case,
Zhengzhou Jinhui Computer System Engineering Co., had ties to a
research center for China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army
University.50 Additionally, six days after the suit was filed, the law
firm that filed the suit was hit with a similar cyber intrusion.51 A
forensic analysis of the attack determined that it probably origi42

See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2012).
Edvard Petersson, Lenovo, Computer Makers Settle Case Over Green Dam Software,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-0208/lenovo-computer-makers-settle-copyright-lawsuit-over-green-dam-software.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
CYBERsitter, LLC v. P.R.C., 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962–63, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
49
Id. at 974.
50
Michael Riley, China Mafia-Style Hack Attack Drives California Firm to Brink,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1127/china-mafia-style-hack-attack-drives-california-firm-to-brink.html.
51
Id.
43

596

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:589

nated in China as well.52 After filing the suit, Brian Milburn, whose
company owns the software, also experienced highly unusual activity on his company’s servers, which stopped two months after the
parties reached a settlement agreement.53
Recent federal investigations and prosecutions indicate an
emerging trend of trade secret theft and economic espionage on
behalf of companies located in China.54 The Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) prosecutes trade secret cases resulting from investigations by various government agencies, including the Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and
Science (“BIS”), and the Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service (“DCIS”).55 Since 2008, a large number of these cases
involved the theft of trade secrets from the United States to China.56 For example, in January of 2013, a Chinese business owner
and his employee pleaded guilty for conspiring to steal trade secrets from the Pittsburgh Corning Corporation on how to produce
a particular type of insulation.57 Both Ji Li Huang and Xiao Guang
Qi were Chinese nationals and attempted to steal the secrets in order to compete with Pittsburgh Corning after Corning announced
it would open a facility in China.58 Huang attempted to gather the
information by trespassing at the plant, recording videos, taking
52

Id.
Id.
54
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2011 U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 30 (2012), available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_mar2012.pdf.
55
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT,
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, TRADE SECRET AND EMBARGO-RELATED CRIMINAL CASES
(JANUARY 2008 TO THE PRESENT: UPDATED MARCH 26, 2014) 1 (2014), available at
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/documents/OngoingExportCaseFactSheet.p
df.
56
See generally id. (providing summaries of select cases of export enforcement,
economic espionage, trade secret theft, and embargo related prosecutions handled by the
DOJ from January 2008 through March 2014).
57
Id. at 26.
58
Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, Two Chinese Nationals Charged
with Stealing Trade Secrets from Missouri Manufacturing Plant (Sept. 30, 1998),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/kansascity/press-releases/2012/two-chinese-nationalscharged-with-stealing-trade-secrets-from-missouri-manufacturing-plant.
53
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photos, and asking employees specific information about the insulation.59 An advertisement was later published in the local newspaper soliciting someone with experience at Pittsburgh Corning to
help develop a factory producing a similar in the Asian market.60 A
confidential source working with the FBI corresponded via email
with the contact in the advertisement about the Pittsburgh Corning’s confidential information.61 Huang and Qi were arrested after
a meeting with the confidential source in Kansas City, where they
intended to pay $100,000 in exchange for the trade secrets.62
The United States government is not alone in the growing concern over trade secret theft in China. In 2009, McAfee63 published
a report about intellectual property vulnerabilities analyzing a survey conducted by the international research firm, Vanson
Bourne.64 The firm surveyed more than one thousand senior IT
decision makers from several countries, including the US and China.65 Exactly half of the respondents to the survey viewed China as
the greatest threat to digital assets and 26% of the respondents surveyed had purposely avoided storing and/or processing data in
China.66 Slightly over 30% of the respondents found the United
States to be threatening to digital assets, placing the United States
in the middle of the list out of the countries reported.67 Germany
was perceived as the least threatening, with slightly less than 20%
of respondents.68 The respondents to the survey were primarily
concerned with both the lack of privacy and intellectual property
59

Crabtree Aff. in Support of App. for Criminal Complaint ¶¶ 10–14, United States v.
Huang, Crim. No. 12-0156-SWH-01/02 (W.D. Mo. 2012).
60
Id. ¶ 15.
61
Id. ¶¶ 16–48.
62
Id. ¶¶ 49–51.
63
Founded in 1987 and now part of Intel Security, McAfee is a global computer
security company protecting millions of consumers, ranging from government agencies to
home users. MCAFEE, CORPORATE FACTSHEET 1 (2014), available at http://
www.mcafee.com/us/resources/brochures/br-mcafee-fact-sheet.pdf.
64
MCAFEE, UNSECURED ECONOMIES: PROTECTING VITAL INFORMATION 1–2 (2009),
available at https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/assets/pdf/mfe_unsec_econ_pr_rpt_fnl_
online_012109.pdf.
65
Id. at 2.
66
Id. at 12–13, 14.
67
Id. at 12.
68
Id.
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protection in China.69 Two years later, McAfee published a followup report and China, Russia, and Pakistan were still regarded as the
least safe for data storage, while Germany and the United States
continued to be perceived among the safest.70 This Note analyzes
trade secret protections under Chinese Law and why, from a legal
perspective, it is a growing area of concern. It will then compare
China with the trade secret protections under the United States’
common-law system and Germany’s civil-law system. Finally, it
will propose reforms to China’s current system, in order to change
current perceptions on trade secret protections in China.
I. TRADE SECRETS IN CHINESE LAW
The Anti-Unfair Competition Law is the primary source for
trade secret law in China.71 In China, a trade secret (or business
secrecy) is defined as “any technology information or business operation information which is unknown to the public, can bring
about economic benefits to the obligee, has practical utility and
about which the obligee has adopted secret-keeping measures.”72
Article 10 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law also provides three
different ways a person can be held liable for trade secret misappropriation.73 Liability can also extend to a third party “who clearly
69

Id. at 14.
MCAFEE, UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES: INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND SENSITIVE
CORPORATE DATA NOW THE LATEST CYBERCRIME CURRENCY 10 (2011), available at
http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Cyber/Documents/rp-undergroundeconomies.pdf.
71
Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade Secret Protection in China, 9 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 355 (2011).
72
Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zhengdong Jingji Fa (中
人民共和国反不正当 争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10
(China), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=125970.
73
Id. (“A business operator shall not use any of the following means to infringe upon
trade secrets: (1) obtaining an obligee’s trade secrets by stealing, luring, intimidation or
any other unfair means; (2) disclosing, using or allowing another person to use the trade
secrets obtained from the obligee by the means mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(3) in violation of the agreement or against the obligee’s demand for keeping trade
secrets, disclosing, using or allowing another person to use the trade secrets he
possesses.” The Act defines a “business operator” as “a legal person or any other
economic organization or individual engaged in commodities marketing or profit-making
services (“commodities” referred to hereinafter includes such services).” Id. at art. 2.
70
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knows or ought to know that the case falls under the unlawful acts
listed in the preceding paragraph shall be deemed as infringement
upon trade secrets . . . .”74 Accordingly, the party alleging misappropriation must prove that:
(1) the asserted trade secret is not publicly known;
(2) the asserted trade secret has economic benefits
and practical utility;
(3) the trade secret owner has taken measures to
protect the confidential nature of the asserted trade
secret; and
(4) there is misappropriation of the asserted trade
secret by a wrongdoer or a third party.75
The first three of these elements that a party alleging misappropriation must prove are required to satisfy the statutory definition of a trade secret under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.76
The information that was allegedly misappropriated will not be
protected unless it first qualifies as a trade secret.77 After the party
alleging misappropriation qualifies the information as a trade secret, it must then satisfy the fourth element and prove that there
was some sort of misappropriation.78 Additionally, this must all be
accomplished through admissible evidence,79 which can be a particularly difficult concept while litigating in China.80 Provisions relating to the enforcement of trade secrets can also be found in the
Contract Law (Article 43 and Chapter 18 Section 3), Company Law
(Articles 149 and 150), Labor Law (Articles 22 and 102), and Labor
Contract Law (Article 23).81
A. Administrative Action
Chinese Law provides three different avenues for trade secret
holders to pursue claims against alleged trade secret misappropriation. One such avenue is for a trade secret holder to pursue admin74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at art. 10.
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 356.
Id. at 355–56.
See generally Bai & Da, supra note 71.
Id.
Id. at 356.
See infra notes 100–105 and accompanying text.
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 356–57.
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istrative action against an alleged infringer. Under the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law, trade secret misappropriation cases can be investigated by the offices of the Administration for Industry and
Commerce (“AICs”).82 An important feature that is available to
trade secret holders through administrative action is that the AICs
have the authority “to order the return of drawings, blueprints, and
other materials containing the trade secrets.”83 Additionally, if certain goods would disclose the trade secret to the public if they were
made available, AICs have the authority to order the destruction of
the goods manufactured using the trade secret.84 In terms of other
remedies, AICs have the authority to order an infringer to stop misappropriating the trade secret and to impose a civil fine ranging
from RMB 10,000 to RMB 200,000.85 Another advantage of an
administrative proceeding is its speed; AICs will “act in a matter of
days or even immediately” if the AICs is “presented with satisfactory evidence.”86 One of the major disadvantages for the trade secret owner is that AICs do not have the power to award damages.87
Consequently, if damages are sought, the trade secret owner must
instead turn to civil litigation.88
B. Criminal Action
A trade secret owner should consider seeking criminal prosecution whenever the owner has suffered “serious” or “exceptionally
serious” losses due to the misappropriation of the trade secret by
another party.89 This is because in a criminal prosecution, the Chinese police will become involved and they have the power to seize
any evidence relevant to the case.90 Under the Criminal Law, the
following acts cause “serious” or “exceptionally serious” losses:

82

Id. at 361–62.
Id. at 362.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Daniel C.K. Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets Protection in China, 47
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1007, 2018 (2014).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 359.
89
Id. at 364.
90
Id.
83
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acquiring a trade secret of another by theft,
inducement, duress or other illegal means;
disclosing, using, or allowing others to use a
trade secret of another acquired by the above
illegal means;
disclosing, using, or allowing others to use a
trade secret in breach of an agreement or a
confidentiality obligation imposed by a legal
owner; or
acquiring, using, or disclosing a trade secret by a
third party, when he knew or should have known
that the trade secret has been misappropriated
in any of the aforementioned ways.91

The acts resulting in criminal liability are strikingly similar to
the civil liabilities under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.92 According to a 2004 Judicial Interpretation issued by the Supreme
People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate, a loss is “serious” if it is more than RMB 50,000 and “exceptionally serious”
if it is more than RMB 2,500,000.93 A subsequent Judicial Interpretation was issued in 2007 and expanded the 2004 Judicial Interpretation to apply to entities as well.94 Generally, criminal prosecution
is very effective in trade secret misappropriation cases and is very
desirable because the evidence seized by police can also be used in
91

Id.; see also Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中 人民共和国 华 刑法) [Criminal
Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar, 14, 1997, effective
Oct. 1, 1997), art. 219 (China).
92
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 356.
93
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 364–65; see also 最高人民法院、最高人民 察院 于 检
关 办理侵犯知 刑事案件具体 用 识产权 应 法律若干 的解 问题 释 [Interpretation of
the Supreme People’s Court & the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Concerning Some
Issues on the Specific Application of Law for Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement
upon Intellectual Property Rights] (promulgated by the 10th Procutorial Comm. Of the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Dec. 8, 2004, effective Dec. 22, 2004) Fashi 19/2004
(China).
94
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 364–65; see also 最高人民法
院关于审理不正当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释, Interpretation II of the
Supreme People’s Court & the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Concerning Some Issues
on the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights, (promulgated by the 10th Procuratorial Comm. of the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, April 5, 2007, effective April 5, 2007) Fashi 6/2007
(China).
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administrative or civil litigation.95 However, it is not easy to get the
police interested in trade secret cases and they tend to be more interested in high profile cases.96 Additionally, the police lack “expertise in trade secrets involving advanced technology,” so they
will have to entrust a “state owned technology research institute or
consultancy organization” to determine the first two elements in a
trade secret misappropriation claim.97
C. Civil Action
In 2007, the Supreme People’s Court issued a Judicial Interpretation clarifying some of the issues that arose enforcing trade
secrets under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.98 The Judicial Interpretation clarified some of the terms included in the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law’s definition of trade secrets, injunctions available
in trade secret misappropriation cases, how to determine damages,
defenses that can be raised, and the burden of proof in trade secret
cases.99 According to the Judicial Interpretation regarding the definition of trade secrets, information is considered “unknown to the
public”100 if the information is unknown to the personnel in the
related field and the information is difficult to obtain.101 Informa95
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 364–65; see also Chow, supra note 86, at 1029 n.123
(noting that most defendants do not feel safe ignoring the investigatory powers of the
Chinese police because the investigative powers are “backed by various coercive
measures”).
96
Bing & Da, supra note 71, at 365 (according to the authors, it is beneficial to try to
package any given trade secret case as high profile to increase the chances for criminal
prosecution); see also Chow, supra note 86, at 1034 (providing that police “may have little
interest in economic crimes, unless these economic crimes result in harm to the public . . .
or threaten national security . . . .”).
97
Chow, supra note 86 at 1032; see also infra note 113 and accompanying text (listing
the elements of a trade secret misappropriation claim).
98
最高人民法院关于审理不正当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释,
[Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Matters About the Application
of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition], Fashi 2/2007 (Sup.
People’s Ct. 2007) (China) [hereinafter Judicial Interpretation], available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/iotspcosmataolittocciuc1390/.
99
Id. at arts. 9–17.
100
This is the first element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade secret
and also the first element a party alleging misappropriation must prove. Bai & Da, supra
note 71, at 355–56.
101
Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 9. The Judicial Interpretation also
includes a list of information that is not unknown to the public: (1) information that is
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tion is considered to “bring about economic benefits to the obligee”102 and have practical utility103 if the information has any practical or potential commercial value, and can be used to enhance the
competitive advantage of the owner.104 Finally, regarding the definition of what constitutes a trade secret, the owner of the information has sufficiently maintained its secrecy105 if the owner takes
reasonable steps under the circumstances to prevent the divulgence of the information.106 Additionally, courts shall ascertain
whether the owner has taken confidentiality measures in accordance with the features of the related information carrier, the desire of the owner to maintain secrecy, how identifiable the confidentiality measures are, the difficulty for others to obtain the information by justifiable means, and other factors.107
The Judicial Interpretation also provides for two defenses to a
claim of trade secret misappropriation: independent research and

common sense or industrial practice for people in the related technical or economic field;
(2) information that only involves the simple combination of dimensions, structures,
materials and components of products, and can be directly obtained by observing the
products by the relevant public after the products enter into the market; (3) information
that has been revealed to the public in any publication or other mass media; (4)
information that has been publicized through reports or exhibits; (5) information that can
be obtained through other public channels; and (6) information that can easily be obtained
with little cost. Id.
102
This is the second element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade
secret and also the part of the second element a party alleging misappropriation must
prove. See Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 355–56.
103
This is the third element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade secret
and also part of the second element a party alleging misappropriation must prove. Id.
104
Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 10.
105
This is the fourth element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade
secret and also the third element a party alleging misappropriation must prove. Bai & Da,
supra note 71, at 356.
106
Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 11.
107
Id. The Judicial Interpretation also provided a non-exhaustive list of sufficient
confidentiality measures: (1) limiting access to the classified information and disclosing it
only to the related personnel who need to know the information; (2) locking up the carrier
of the classified information; (3) indicate the confidentiality of the information on the
carrier of the information; (4) adopting passwords or codes on the classified information;
(5) implementing a confidentiality agreement; (6) limiting visitors to the classified
machinery, factory, workshop or any other place, or imposing confidentiality agreements
on visitors; and (7) any other reasonable measure guaranteeing the confidentiality of the
information. See id.

604

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:589

reverse engineering.108 Reverse engineering covers information
that is obtained by dismantling, mapping, or analyzing the product
when the product is obtained from public channels.109 A party who
acquires another’s trade secret through illegitimate means110 is not
afforded the protections of the reverse engineering defense.111 The
Judicial Interpretation also places a high burden of proof on the
plaintiff to successfully assert a claim of trade secret misappropriation.112 The plaintiff must submit evidence that is sufficient to satisfy all of the statutory requirements under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, evidence proving that the defendant is using similar or
substantially similar information to the plaintiff’s trade secret, and
that the defendant has used unfair methods.113
The Judicial Interpretation also elaborated on the remedies
available to trade secret owners through civil litigation. There are
three acceptable methods for calculating damages awards in trade
secret misappropriation cases: “(1) plaintiff’s lost profits; (2) defendant’s profits realized from the misappropriation; and (3) reasonable royalty.”114 Additionally, if the trade secret was made
known to the general public, the damages awarded to the plaintiff
shall be calculated according to the commercial value of the trade
secret.115 If a plaintiff successfully proves a claim of trade secret
misappropriation, it is likely that a permanent injunction will be
108

Id. at art. 12.
Id.
110
Examples of what constitutes acquiring through illegitimate means are contained
within the Anti-Unfair Competition Law are (1) obtaining the trade secret of another by
theft, inducement, duress, or any other unfair means; (2) disclosing, using, or allowing
others to use another’s trade secret which was obtained by the aforementioned unfair
means; or (3) disclosing, using, or allowing others to use a trade secret in breach of an
agreement with the legal owner. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
111
Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 12. So, for example, a party who obtains
the trade secret of another by any means other than independent research and
development or reverse engineering, and then claims that it was through reverse
engineering, will not be afforded the reverse engineering defense. See id.
112
Id. at art. 1.
113
Id. at art. 14.
114
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 361.
115
Id. (explaining that “[t]he commercial value of a trade secret shall be determined
with reference to its research and development costs, proceeds from practicing the trade
secret, the tangible benefits, the length of time during which the trade secret confers
competitive advantages to the plaintiff, etc.”).
109
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granted.116 However, in China, trade secret owners are no longer
entitled to an automatic permanent injunction after they successfully prove misappropriation.117 As Benjamin Bai and Guoping Da
assert, “[g]enerally, the length of a permanent injunction will not
be extended to the time when the trade secret becomes known to
the general public, if at all.”118 Further, if the length of an injunction is unreasonable under the circumstances and the owner’s
competitive advantage is protected, a court may limit the scope and
length of an injunction.119
D. Chinese Trade Secret Case Statistics
In 2013, Chinese courts of the first instance accepted 88,583
civil cases concerning intellectual property rights.120 This is significant when compared to data from 2010, where Chinese courts of
the first instance received 42,931 total civil cases concerning intellectual property rights, a 40.18% increase over 2009.121 These are
dramatic increases, especially because China has been the most litigious country for intellectual property disputes since 2005.122
2013 Civil IP Cases in China123
Number

Percent Change
From 2012

Civil Cases (commenced)

88,583

+1.33%

Civil Cases (concluded)

88,286

+5.29%

Copyright

51,351

–4.64%

Type of Case

116

Id.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.; see also Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 16.
120
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION BY CHINESE COURTS IN 2013 (2013) [hereinafter SUPREME
PEOPLE’S COURT], available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zscq/bhcg/201404/
t20140425_195314.html.
121
China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, NAT’L INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY
STRATEGY (May 12, 2011), http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=11395.
122
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 351.
123
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120.
117
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Patent

9,195

–5.01%

Trademark

23,272

+17.45%

Unfair Competition (includes trade
secret cases)

1,302

+15.94%

Technology Contract Agreements

949

+27.21%

2,514

+13.91%

Other

2010 Civil IP Cases in China124
Number

Percent Change
From 2009

Civil Cases (commenced)

42,931

+40.18%

Civil Cases (concluded)

41,718

+36.74%

Copyright

24,719

+61.54%

Patent

5,785

+30.82%

Trademark

8,460

22.5%

Unfair Competition (includes trade
secret cases)

1,131

–11.78%

Technology Contract Dispute

670

–10.31%

1,966

+14.17%

Type of Case

Other

124

China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 121.

2015]

BURDENSOME SECRETS

607

2013 Administrative IP Cases in China125
Number

Percent Change
From 2012

Administrative Cases (commenced)

2,886

–1.43%

Administrative Cases (concluded)

2,901

Negligible

3

None

697

–8.29%

2,161

+0.51%

25

+66.67%

Type of Case

Copyright
Patent
Trademark
Other

125

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120.
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2013 Criminal IP Cases in China126
Cases

Persons
Convicted

Percent
Change From
2012

Cases Filed

9,331

N/A

–28.79%

Criminal Prosecution
(concluded)

9,212

13,424 (13,265
were given criminal sanctions)

–28% (cases)
–13.49% (convictions)

Trademark Counterfeiting

1,546

2,462

N/A

Production and Sale
of Counterfeit and
Inferior Goods

1,496

2,221

N/A

Illegal Mfg. and Sale
of Illegally Mfg.’d
Marks of Registered
Trademarks

350

589

N/A

Counterfeiting Patent

1

0

N/A

1,499

1,490

N/A

Sale of Infringing Reproductions

15

33

N/A

Trade Secret Cases127

50

N/A

People Convicted for
Trade Secret Misappropriation

71

N/A

Copyright Infringement

126

Id.
Interestingly, the data for the number of trade-secret cases concluded and the
number of persons convicted, 50% and 71% respectively, is exactly the same as the data
provided in 2010. Compare SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120, with China’s
Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 121.
127
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2010 Criminal IP Cases in China128
China

Percent Change
From 2009

Criminal Prosecution
(concluded)

3,942

+7.7%

People Prosecuted

6,001

+2.8%

People Convicted

6,000

+2.9%

Trade Secret Cases Sentenced

50

N/A

People Convicted for Trade Secret
Misappropriation

71

N/A

128

China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 121.
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Duration of Pro131
ceedings

Average Damages
Claimed (RMB)

Average Damages
Awarded
132
(RMB)

Average Costs
Claimed (RMB)

Average Costs
Awarded (RMB)

14

7 (11)

300,000

95,000 (2)

0

0

40%

2011

38

9 (17)

1,670,993

397,377 (8)

89,986

26,002

35%

2010

47

5 (25)

1,314,496

273,635 (13) 34,494

6,640

47%

2009

52

8 (15)

6,839,600

209,250 (8) 23,367

21,646

39%

2008

55

9 (22)

732,030

215,511 (22) 15,709

14,656

48%

2007

63

7 (21)

505,789

309,758 (25)

7,701

3,040

63%

2006

52

6 (23)

822,323

423,856 (12) 14,736

4,245

39%

Injunction Ratio

Judgments

2012

130

Year

133

2006–2012 Civil Trade Secret Cases in China129

The data compiled for the 2013 civil, administrative, and criminal intellectual property cases in China yields some surprising results regarding trade secrets. Out of all of the civil intellectual
129
CIELA Summary Report: Trend by Year, CIELA http://www.ciela.cn/
Search/TrendByYearResult.aspx?pageId=1&ppId=2&language=en&city=&court=&main
Type=Unfair+Competition&subType=Trade+Secret&cause=&industry= (last visited
Jan. 29, 2015). There is a discrepancy between the data provided SIPO and the data
provided by CIELA. This is because the data used by CIELA only comes from judgments
published by major IP courts around China. See FAQ, CIELA
http://www.ciela.cn/Content2.aspx?pageId=10&ppId=10&language=en (last visited Jan.
29, 2015).
130
See also Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 354–55 (illustrating the number of trade secret
misappropriation cases per year from 1995–2005).
131
Refers to the average time in months for proceedings to conclude. The number in
parenthesis indicates the number of judgments used to calculate the data. CIELA
Summary Report: Trend by Year, supra note 129.
132
The number in parenthesis indicates the number of judgments used to calculate the
data.
133
Refers to the number of judgments in which in final injunction is awarded. This does
not include data on either pre-trial injunctions or interim injunctions because judgments
do not currently contain this data. Id.
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property cases commenced in 2013, only 1,302 out of the 88,583
were about unfair competition, which is roughly 1.47% of the total
number of cases.134 Although this number represents a 15.94% increase since 2012, it is miniscule when you consider that trade secret cases only account for a percentage of that 1.47%.135 There are
similar results with respect to the criminal cases. Out of the 9,212
cases that were concluded, only 50 trade secret cases were sentenced.136 This too accounts for a very small percentage of all of the
criminal intellectual property cases, roughly 0.5%.137 These numbers are even more startling when compared to the data from 2010.
Out of all of the civil intellectual property cases commenced in
2010, only 1,131 out of the 42,931 were about unfair competition,
which is roughly 2.6% of the total number of cases.138 The percentage of actual trade secret cases is even smaller because they are
contained within the unfair competition metric. Out of the 3,942
criminal cases that were concluded in 2010, only 50 trade secret
cases were sentenced.139 This too accounts for a very small percentage of all intellectual property cases, roughly 1.3%.140 Although the
total number of civil and criminal intellectual property cases has
dramatically increased, the number of trade secret cases has remained relatively stagnant and accounts for smaller percentages.
II. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS IN CHINESE TRADE SECRET
LITIGATION
A. Specific Legal Obstacles for Trade Secret Owners
One possible reason for the significantly lower amount of trade
secret cases in China as compared to other intellectual property
cases is the difficulty for plaintiffs to actually prove misappropriation.141 This section explores various evidentiary concerns in Chi134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See supra note 123 and accompanying table.
See id.
See supra note 126 and accompanying table.
See id.
See supra note 124 and accompanying table.
See supra note 128 and accompanying table.
See id.
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 351, 354.
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nese trade secret litigation, including obtaining evidence, evidence
preservation, and suggested reforms to Chinese civil procedure,
and how it impacts trade secret enforcement.
Remedies available to trade secret owners through administrative, criminal, or civil enforcement are difficult to obtain under
Chinese law.142 This is the result of various deficiencies in China’s
Anti-Unfair Competition Law, most notably the constraints on gathering evidence for use in litigation.143 Additionally, the AntiUnfair Competition Law does not expressly authorize judges to
issue certain provisional orders.144 This is different from other
Chinese intellectual property laws and these provisional orders are
often critical to the success of a civil enforcement action.145 Other
weaknesses in China’s civil enforcement system include “mechanisms for gathering evidence; procedures for obtaining preliminary
injunctions; and the relative weight afforded certain kinds of evidence, as reflected in the overreliance on original documentary
evidence over oral testimony.”146 Without changes to these areas,
effective trade secret enforcement in China will continue to be a
challenge.147

142

See FROMAN, supra note 17, at 32.
Id.
144
Id. Recent changes to China’s Civil Procedure Law permit judges to issue
preliminary injunctions, but not enough time has passed to determine whether these
changes have been effective in practice. Id. However, there have been positive recent
developments. See infra notes 182–97 and accompanying text.
145
FROMAN, supra note 17, at 32. Provisional orders, such as preliminary injunctions,
are particularly important in trade secret cases because they can prevent the defendant
from continuing to use the information in question until a final judgment is rendered.
This can prevent the defendant from utilizing the information to make a profit and, more
importantly, limit the likelihood of any further dissemination of the information. See infra
Part II.B.
146
FROMAN, supra note 17, at 33.
147
Id. There have been positive developments in reforming trade secret protection
China. For example, at the twenty-fourth US–China Joint Commission on Commerce and
Trade (“JCCT”), China’s National Leading Group on Combating IPR Infringement and
the Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeit and Substandard Goods committed to publish
an Action Program on trade secret protection and enforcement. The program is expected
to include concrete enforcement actions, improving public awareness about trade secrets,
and requirements for strict compliance with trade secret laws. However, it is unclear
whether this will have any significant positive impact. See 24th US-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
143
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If a company is unable to protect its trade secrets, it weakens
the incentive for the company to develop new technologies in China and could lead a company to withhold its most advanced technologies from China.148 Both of these factors could severely hamper China’s innovation development.149 The concern over trade
secret protection in China has grown significantly since 2011 and
the Chinese government has recognized the value of stronger trade
secret protection.150 However, despite the growing concern over
trade secrets, Chinese officials still have limited experience in dealing with these issues because of the small number of trade secret
cases brought before administrative and judicial bodies.151 One of
the problems trade secret owners have in misappropriation claims
is that unlike other forms of intellectual property—such as patents
and trademarks—trade secrets are not formally registered with
government authorities and officials do not have “a formal written
document to prove that a company holds a purported trade secret.”152
Trade secret owners trying to protect their information in China often face the challenge of gathering and using evidence to
prove infringement.153 In civil proceedings, “plaintiffs must collect
and submit their own evidence to meet their burden of proof regarding, inter alia, trade secret misappropriation and damages.”154
Because Chinese courts rarely accept evidence unless it is in its
original form, documentary evidence is the only evidence that carries significant weight in court and limits the admissibility of witness testimony.155 Because there is no US-style discovery under the
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/Decem
ber/JCCT-outcomes (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
148
THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN CHINA 2 (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/2013.09%20USCBC%20Recommendations%
20for%20Strengthening%20Trade%20Secret%20Protection%20in%20China_0.pdf.
149
Id.
150
See id. at 1, 2.
151
Id. at 5; see also supra Part I.D. and accompanying text.
152
THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 148, at 5.
153
Id. at 6.
154
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363.
155
See id. at 363–64; see also Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Min Shi Su Song Fa (中
人民共和国 华 民事 法 诉讼) [Civil Procedure Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the
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Chinese system, a plaintiff would need to know about the existence
of evidence before seeking an evidence preservation order.156 Furthermore, illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in court and
could be grounds for reversal on appeal.157 Consequently, the best
strategy for trade secret owners is often to adopt strong preventive
measures to avoid having to litigate in the first place.158
This evidentiary challenge often discourages companies from
filing trade secret cases in China and can help explain the low numbers in the charts above.159 According to the US-China Business
Council, “these challenges foster a broad perception that trade secret enforcement is difficult in China, discouraging companies
from bringing their products, services, and know-how to China,
which prevents Chinese consumers and businesses from having
access to the latest technologies.”160 Even if the parties are able to
obtain this evidence, there is still a lack of clear information on how
the evidence will be protected during and after a trial.161 One of the
most important features of a trade secret is that it is secret.162 Consequently, trade secret owners will be reluctant to bring claims if
they cannot be assured that the confidentiality of the information
will be maintained both during and after the trial.163 There is no
guideline at the national level164 and unless the verdict is in favor of
the plaintiff, there is no clear obligation on courts to maintain the
confidentiality of the information disclosed during trial.165 This
standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Oct. 28, 2007), art. 68
(China).
156
Chow, supra note 86, at 1028.
157
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363; see also, 最高人民法院关
于民事
诉讼证据的若干规定, Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil
Proceedings (promulgated by the Jud. Comm. of Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 21, 2001,
effective Apr. 1, 2002), at 68, Fa Shi 33/2001 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2001) (China).
158
See Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 365; see also Chow, supra note 86 at 1038-39.
159
See THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, at 7.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
See id. at 2.
163
See id. at 8.
164
The Jiangsu Higher People’s Court released guidelines stating that all parties
(including expert panelists) involved in a trade secrets case must sign a guarantee to the
court not to disclose or use trade secrets disclosed during trial, but no such obligation
exists on a national level. This is similar to a protection order. See id.
165
Id.
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drastically escalates the risks of pursuing litigation and further dissuades trade secret owners from bringing trade secret misappropriation claims in Chinese civil courts.166
Two final areas of concern are evidence preservation and preliminary injunctions. Evidence preservation is a tool that is often
used by trade secret owners to obtain evidence of misappropriation.167 An evidence preservation order is a court ruling that requires a defendant to preserve and submit evidence to the court.168
If the circumstances prescribed in Article 74 of the Chinese Civil
Procedure Law apply, a party may seek such an order ex parte.169
The judges usually enforce an evidence preservation order themselves and the court may demand the requesting party to post a
bond.170 These orders can be especially effective because the respondent is required to produce the relevant documentation and
evidence on the spot and is not notified of the order in advance.171
Any evidence that is obtained and verified by the court is admissible in the subsequent proceedings.172 Because evidence preservation can be such a powerful tool, courts have tried to prevent its
abuse by requiring the movant to first present some preliminary
evidence, which as discussed earlier can be very difficult to obtain.173
Out of all of the intellectual property rights cases in 2013, China granted 77.78% of all preliminary injunction applications, 97.63%
of preservation of evidence applications, and 96.97% of all preservation of property applications.174 At first glance, these may seem like
166

See id.
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363.
168
THE US–CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 148, at 8.
169
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363 (Article 74 provides: “Under circumstances where
there is a likelihood that evidence may be destroyed, lost, or difficult to obtain later, the
parties in the proceedings may apply to the People’s Court for preservation of evidence.
The People’s Court may also on its own initiative take measures to preserve such
evidence.”); see also Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Min Shi Su Song Fa (中 人民共和国
华 民事 法 诉讼) [Civil Procedure Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Oct. 28, 2007), art. 74 (China).
170
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
See id. at 363–64; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
174
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120.
167
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effective enforcement measures based on the high rates of applications granted, but the rates appear to be deceptively high. In 2013,
courts of the first instance accepted 88,583 total intellectual property cases.175 However, out of those 88,583 cases, eleven cases involved applications for preliminary injunctions, 173 involved applications for evidence preservation, and forty-seven involved preservation of property.176 So in reality, 0.012% of all intellectual property cases for 2013 involved applications for preliminary injunctions
and out of that 0.012%, 77.78% of applications were granted.177 Preservation of evidence applications comprised 0.195% of all intellectual property cases and of that 0.195%, 97.63% were granted.178 Preservation of property applications comprised 0.053% of all intellectual property cases and of that 0.053%, 96.97% of applications were
granted.179
Similarly, out of all of the intellectual property rights cases in
2010, China granted 97.46% of preservation of evidence applications.180 As with the 2013 percentages, “pre-screening” by the
Case Filing Division (“CFD”) probably contributes to the high
grant rate because they do not reveal how many cases were rejected
by the CFD.181 This perception changes if you compare the number
of applications with the total number of civil cases admitted at first
instance.182 In 2010, there were 294 pretrial preservation of evidence applications and 42,931 intellectual property civil cases admitted at first instance.183 This accounts for a mere .68% out of all
of the cases filed in 2010.184 This makes the chances of a trade secret owner obtaining this important tool look very bleak.
Preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases are particularly
important because they enable a plaintiff to prevent a defendant
175

Id.; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120.
177
See id.
178
See id.
179
See id.
180
Mark Cohen, “Case Filing” In China’s Courts and Their Impact on IP Cases, China
IPR (Mar. 24, 2012), available at http://chinaipr.com/2012/03/24/case-filing-in-chinascourts-and-their-impact-on-ip-cases/.
181
See id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
176
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from further using the information before a final judgment is rendered.185 They also limit the likelihood of any further dissemination
of the trade secret by the defendant.186 However, obtaining a preliminary injunction is difficult in trade secret cases because it is
much more difficult for a plaintiff to prove a likelihood of success
on the merits of the case.187 In China, it is unusual for a plaintiff to
obtain a preliminary injunction for trade secret misappropriation.188
The rate at which preliminary injunctions are granted suffers from
the same inflation issues as applications for preservation of evidence. The reported grant rate for preliminary injunctions in civil
intellectual property cases in 2010 was 89.74%.189 There were a total of fifty-five pre-trial applications for preliminary injunctions in
civil intellectual property cases, out of 42,932 total cases admitted
at first instance.190 According to these figures, only 0.12% of the
civil intellectual property cases requested preliminary injunctions,
which would probably be an even smaller number in regards to the
total number of trade secret cases.191 This appears even bleaker
when compared to the 0.012% of civil intellectual property cases for
2013.192 Consequently, preliminary injunctions are not as readily
available as they seem and are yet another challenge facing a trade
secret owner trying to enforce his rights.
B. Recent Reforms and Other Considerations
The Chinese Civil Procedure Law was recently revised and the
new law went into effect in the beginning of 2013.193 There were
185

THE US–CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 148, at 8.
Id. This can be crucial for trade secret owners because even if the plaintiff prevails in
a misappropriation action, a court can still order an injunction that lasts until the
information becomes known to the general public, or, if that is unacceptable, for another
period or scope determined by the court. Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 16.
If the information is disseminated because a preliminary injunction is not issued, it could
severely limit the protection a prevailing party will receive.
187
Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 361.
188
Id.
189
Cohen, supra note 180.
190
Id.
191
See id.
192
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
193
Mark Cohen, Crossing the River by Feeling the IP Stones: How China’s Civil Procedure
System Benefits from Reforms Made in IP Civil Litigation, China IPR (Nov. 8, 2012),
186
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numerous reforms, including an article that obliges courts to make
their judgments publicly available unless there are issues involving
privacy, state secrets, or trade secrets.194 One of the most important reforms for trade secrets is Article 100, which extended interlocutory injunctions to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and consequently, trade secrets.195 This was applied in Eli Lilly v. Huang,196
a trade secret dispute between a US pharmaceutical corporation,
its Chinese subsidiary, and a former chief researcher of that subsidiary.197 Huang began his employment on May 3, 2012 and signed a
confidentiality agreement with his employer.198 A few months later
on January 27, 2013, Huang downloaded twenty-one documents
from the company’s server, but was not authorized to do so.199
Huang refused to delete the documents despite numerous requests
by Eli Lilly and instead chose to resign.200 Eli Lilly filed suit under
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, seeking injunctive relief and
RMB 20,000,000 in damages.201 In August 2013, the Shanghai
First Intermediate Court issued an interlocutory injunction against
Huang and Eli Lilly deposited RMB 100,000 as a security bond for
the order.202 By doing so, the court applied Article 100 of the new
Civil Procedure Law and granted interim measures that used to
only be available under patent, copyright, and trademark law.203
This was a very important decision for trade secret owners, but the
long-term effects of the new Civil Procedure Law are still unclear.
However, this may be the beginning of a new trend. In January
of 2014, a Chinese subsidiary of Novartis was granted China’s first
http://chinaipr.com/2012/11/08/crossing-the-river-by-feeling-the-ip-stones-how-chinascivil-procedure-system-benefits-from-reforms-made-in-ip-civil-litigation/.
194
Id.
195
Christine Yiu & Yijun Ge, Eli Lilly v. Huang: Shanghai Court issues interlocutory
injunction against breach of trade secret, BIRD & BIRD (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2013/china/eli-lilly-v-huang-shanghaicourt-issues-interlocutory-injunction-against-breach-of-trade-secret.
196
This decision is not publicly available and has not been published because it involves
trade secrets and confidential information.
197
Yiu & Ge, supra note 195.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
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pre-suit injunction in a trade secret dispute.204 In the case, a former
employee downloaded roughly 880 documents from the company’s
database after he resigned, and later joined a competitor.205 Novartis applied for the injunction “seeking to restrain the ex employee
from disclosing, using, or allowing others to use the documents
containing trade secrets and related confidential information.”206
The petition was accepted the same day it was filed and the injunction was issued within forty-eight hours.207 The Shanghai First Intermediate Court issued the injunction—the same court that issued
China’s first in-suit preliminary injunction in Eli Lilly v. Huang.208
One final aspect to consider is the relative speed at which Chinese courts turn over intellectual property decisions. Overall, it
seems that China has a shorter notion of time when it comes to intellectual property than the United States.209 For example, trade
secret owners should consider that Chinese employees tend to
leave their current employment as frequently as once every two to
three years.210 In terms of litigation, there is a six-month time limit
on a domestic intellectual property rights court proceeding of first
instance.211 The speed of these proceedings can be both beneficial
and detrimental to trade secret owners. Faster proceedings mean
that a trade secret owner can get a permanent injunction in a relatively short amount of time and can better protect its competitive
advantage.212 However, this “rocket docket” can also be detrimental in the sense that they only have six months for a type of high
stakes case where the burden of proof on the plaintiff is relatively
high and admissible evidence is difficult to obtain.213
204
Benjamin Bai, Preliminary Injunctions in China: the Pendulum Has Swung Back!,
KLUWER PATENT BLOG (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2014/
04/30/preliminary-injunctions-in-china-the-pendulum-has-swung-back/.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See Mark Cohen, China IP Time and The New York Minute, CHINA IPR (Nov. 21,
2012), available at http://chinaipr.com/2012/11/21/china-ip-time-and-the-new-yorkminute/.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
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C. China, Germany, and the United States
China, Germany, and the United States are all members of the
World Trade Organization. Germany and the United States were
among the first members and joined in January of 1995.214 China
did not become a member of the World Trade Organization until
several years later in December of 2001.215 All three countries are
also bound by the minimum standards set out by the World Trade
Organization’s 1994 TRIPS Agreement.216 Article 39 of the TRIPS
Agreement concerns “undisclosed information” and establishes
the minimum requirements for information to be protected under
the Agreement.217 Importantly however, the TRIPS Agreement
does not provide a minimum requirement for adverse parties to
obtain evidence or information from one another.218 Judicial authorities only have the power to order that the opposing party produce the evidence and this is subject to the protection of confidential information.219 Consequently, China’s current evidentiary procedures are acceptable under the minimum standards set out by the
TRIPS Agreement.

214

Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2015).
215
Id.
216
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
217
Id. at art. 39 (The information is protected as long as it: “(a) is secret in the sense
that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components,
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally
deal with the kind of information in question; (b) has commercial value because it is
secret; and (c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.”).
218
See id. at art. 43 (“The judicial authorities shall have the authority, where a party has
presented reasonably available evidence sufficient to support its claims and has specified
evidence relevant to substantiation of its claims which lies in the control of the opposing
party, to order that this evidence be produced by the opposing party, subject in
appropriate cases to conditions which ensure the protection of confidential
information.”).
219
Id.
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D. Trade Secrets in the United States
The applicable regulatory framework in the United States is
slightly more complicated than in other countries. There is no
binding federal civil law on trade secrets.220 Instead, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) in 1979.221 The
UTSA222 only has force of law through positive enactment by the
states and all of the states (including Washington, DC; Puerto Rico; and the US Virgin Islands) except for Massachusetts and New
York have adopted the act.223 The states that have yet to enact the
UTSA instead rely on common law to enforce trade secrets.224 The
UTSA provides a definition of trade secret and any type of information can be considered a trade secret as long as the definitional
requirements are satisfied.225 Although it has been the subject of
debate, virtually all of the states now view trade secrets as an intellectual property right.226
In addition to the UTSA, through the Economic Espionage Act
of 1996 (“EEA”),227 the federal government protects trade secrets
220

Baker & McKenzie, Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in
the Internal Market, app. 1 at 134 (April 2013) available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_appendix-1_en.pdf.
221
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT PREFATORY NOTE (amended 1985).
222
For purposes of this analysis, the provisions of the UTSA will be treated as the trade
secret law for the entire United States and will be viewed from a federal level. This makes
the United States easier to compare with the legal systems of China and Germany and
facilitates a more uniform analysis. Furthermore, every state has its own procedural and
evidentiary rules, so it is much cleaner to compare the United States on a federal level
where only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply to the appropriate analyses.
223
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Legislative Fact Sheet–Trade
Secrets Act, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Trade%20Secrets%20Act. Although North Carolina has not adopted the UTSA, its Trade
Secrets Protection Act is substantially similar to the UTSA. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66152-66-157 (2014).
224
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at 134.
225
Id.; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1 (amended 1985).(“Trade secret means
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”).
226
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at 135.
227
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012).
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through criminal enforcement sections.228 The act “is concerned in
particular with economic espionage229 and foreign activities to acquire US trade secrets230.”231 The EEA also explicitly calls for the
court in any prosecution under the act to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets by entering orders and taking other necessary
and appropriate actions.232 However, the EEA is only applicable to
conduct occurring outside of the United States if the offender is a
citizen or permanent resident alien or an organization organized
under United States law, or if “an act in furtherance of the offense
was committed in the United States.”233 The EEA does not provide for a private right of action, so a company seeking civil remedies for trade secret theft must generally look to state trade secret
law, which typically is some form of the UTSA.234 Additionally,
228

See id.
Economic espionage occurs when an actor “intending or knowing that the offense
will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; (2) without authorization copies,
duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a
trade secret; (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4) attempts to
commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with
one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012).
230
Trade secret theft occurs when an actor “with intent to convert a trade secret, that is
related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign
commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending
or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly—
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information; (2) without authorization copies,
duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such
information; (3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4) attempts to
commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with one or
more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1832 (2012).
231
ONCIX, supra note 6, at iii.
232
18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2012).
233
Id. § 1837.
234
See id. §§ 1831–39.
229
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even if a criminal case is pursued under the EEA, a party can still
enforce its rights through parallel civil litigation because the EEA
does not displace or preempt any other remedies provided by state
law for the misappropriation of a trade secret.235
In order to successfully commence a civil proceeding for trade
secret infringement, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) the plaintiff
has a protectable interest in a trade secret; (2) such trade secret has
been misappropriated; and (3) such misappropriation236 has occurred by the defendant.”237 Under the UTSA, the remedies available to a plaintiff are injunctive relief for actual and threatened misappropriation, or damages and the two are not mutually exclusive.238 Additionally, preliminary injunctions are available if the
plaintiff can show in federal court: (1) a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the plaintiff; (3) balancing the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s hardships arising from
granting or not granting the injunction is in the plaintiff’s favor;
and (4) the issuance of the injunction is in the public interest.239
Temporary restraining orders preventing the defendant from
destroying evidence or data can also be obtained in federal court by

235

Id. § 1838 (“This chapter . . . shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other
remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by the United States Federal, State,
commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade
secret . . . .”).
236
The UTSA provides the definition of “misappropriation” as: (i) acquisition of a
trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret
was acquired by improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent by a person who: (a) used improper means to acquire
knowledge of the trade secret; (b) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to
know that is knowledge of the trade secret was (1) derived from or through a person who
had utilized improper means to acquire it; (2) acquired under circumstances giving rise to
a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (3) derived from or through a person who
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (c)
before a material change of his/her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a
trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.2 (amended 1985).
237
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220 at 135.
238
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3 and cmts. (amended 1985).
239
See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 952 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
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proving the same requirements for a preliminary injunction.240 Furthermore, temporary restraining orders can be issued ex parte if
the plaintiff alleges under oath specific facts that
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, or damage will result to it before the defendant
can be heard, and the plaintiff certifies in writing the
efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it
should not be required.241
Criminal actions are also available under federal law if the theft
of trade secrets is related to or in products within interstate commerce.242 However, in general, remedies are not available against a
third party who obtained the information in good faith and is not
subject to a confidentiality agreement, but once the party is given
notice of the misappropriation, any continued use would become
misappropriation under the UTSA.243
Litigation in the United States includes a pre-trial process
known as discovery, which involves the parties exchanging information and potential evidence.244 In the federal system, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) generally governs the discovery
process.245 However, disclosure of trade secrets during discovery
presents a particular problem in litigation.246 The party from whom
discovery is sought may move for a protective order from the court,
which could require the trade secret not to be revealed or revealed
in only a limited manner.247 These protective orders often impose
different levels of access restriction to confidential information and
could limit access to the trade secret so it is only available to the
attorney and prevent the other party’s business from having access
to it.248 Additionally, Section 5 of the UTSA explicitly requires a

240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

Baker & McKenzie, supra note 217 at 136–37.
Id. at 137; see also, FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012).
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at 137.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
Id.
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at app. 6, 652.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at app. 6, 652.
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court to protect the secrecy of an alleged trade secret.249 When direct evidence is unavailable, a party may have to resort to proving
trade secret misappropriation through circumstantial evidence.250
There is little statistical data available about trade secret litigation in the United States.251 However, trade secret litigation in the
federal courts252 is growing exponentially, and at the projected rate,
trade secret cases should double again by 2017.253 The following
chart covers the rough percentages of the outcomes of preliminary
motions filed for civil trade secret cases in federal court from 1950–
2008:
Outcome by Procedural Posture 1950–2008254
Preliminary
Injunction/TRO255

Motion to
Dismiss

Misappropriator’s
Motion For
Summary Judgment

Owner Prevailed

34.4%

57.6%

43.5%

Alleged
Misappropriator
Prevailed

60.1%

39.1%

51.0%

The primary value of looking at this data is for determining the
change of success each party has at a particular procedural post249

Id. (requiring a court to “preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by
reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connection with
discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and
ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret
without prior court approval.”).
250
See Ajaxo Inc. v. E*TRADE Group, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 221, 247 (Cal. App. 6th
Dist. 2005).
251
Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 293 (2010).
252
For a statistical analysis of trade secret litigation in state courts, see David S.
Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum & Jill Weader,
A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57 (2011).
253
Alemling et al., supra note 251, at 293.
254
Id. at 316.
255
An owner requested a preliminary injunction or TRO in roughly one-third of trade
secret cases, while roughly one half of misappropriators filed motions to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment. Id.
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ure.256 When compared to the data obtained from China in 2010
and 2013 by dividing the number of motion applications by the total
number of civil intellectual property cases, the results are staggering. Just based on motions for preliminary injunctions and evidence
preservation/temporary restraining orders, trade secret owners in
the United States are likely to be more successful in obtaining these
important tools than trade secret owners in China.
Pursuant to section 404 of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (“PRO IP Act”),
the Department of Justice and the FBI provide data on the prosecution of intellectual property crimes, which includes trade secret
theft and economic espionage under the EEA.257

256

Id.
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT FY 2012 1, 30
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/iptaskforce/proipact/doj-pro-ip-rpt
2012.pdf.
257
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DOJ Intellectual Property Crimes Prosecuted258
District
Totals

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

Investigative
Matters
Received by
AUSAs

365

285

402

387

390

Defendants
Charged

259

235

259

215

254

Cases
Charged

197

173

177

168

178

Defendants
Sentenced

242

223

207

208

202

No Prison
Term

107

126

121

102

95

1-12 Months

48

35

38

27

46

13-24
Months

45

29

27

33

26

25-36
Months

20

6

10

17

15

37-60
Months

19

18

7

21

17

60+ Months

3

9

4

8

3

258

Id. at 31. These numbers reflect criminal cases where the following charges were
brought against a defendant: criminal copyright infringement, circumvention of copyright
protection systems, economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, counterfeit labeling,
criminal copyright infringement, live musical performance infringement, unauthorized
recording of motion pictures, trafficking in counterfeit goods, and signal piracy. Id. at 30.
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FBI Intellectual Property Investigations
FY 2010259

FY 2011260

FY 2012261

Pending
Investigations

486

499

460

Theft of Trade
Secrets

94

100

106

Copyright Infringement
(Software)

108

85

70

Copyright Infringement (Other than Software)

152

141

121

Trademark Infringement

55

54

49

Copyright Infringement (Signal Theft)

27

21

16

Counterfeit Aircraft Parts

21

24

17

Counterfeit Electrical Parts

11

22

17

Counterfeit Automotive Parts

3

7

11

Counterfeit
Health Products

15

45

53

259

FBI, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2010, 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 REPORT],
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2011/01/27/pro-ipfbi-report.pdf.
260
FBI, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2011, 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 REPORT],
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fbi-proip-rpt2011.pdf.
261
FBI, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 REPORT],
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2013/01/29/fbi-proip-rpt2012.pdf.
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FY 2010259

FY 2011260

FY 2012261

Investigations
Initiated

218

235

170

Arrests

66

93

111

Information /
Indictments

73

79

66

Convictions

79

79

74

The data provided by the FBI shows a growth in the number of
criminal trade secret investigations/cases in the United States. For
the 2010 fiscal year, roughly 19% of the FBI’s pending intellectual
property investigations were for trade secret theft.262 This grew to
roughly 20% in the 2011 fiscal year263 and to roughly 23% in the
2012 fiscal year.264 However, the actual rate at which criminal intellectual property cases were concluded by the DOJ seems to be
much slower than in China. For example, in 2013, China concluded
9,212 criminal cases for intellectual property infringement out of
the 9,331 that were filed,265 but in 2012, the DOJ only charged 178
cases out of the 390 investigative matters received by Assistant US
Attorneys.266
One of the major drawbacks of a United States style discovery
procedure is the potential for discovery abuse.267 According to
Chief Judge Randall Rader of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, the greatest weakness of the United States’
court system is its expense and the driving factor for that expense is
discovery excesses.268 This is especially true for intellectual proper262

2010 REPORT, supra note 259.
2011 REPORT, supra note 260.
264
2012 REPORT, supra note 261.
265
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
266
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
267
For a model order proposing a solution to remedy this problem in patent cases, see
[Model] Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (2011), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgibin/view_document.cgi?document=22218.
268
Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, E.D. Texas Judicial
Conference, available at http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/
263
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ty cases, where in a 2010 report the Federal Judicial Center determined that cost of intellectual property cases was almost 62% higher than others.269 This expense problem can be exacerbated when
attorneys use discovery as a tactical weapon.270 When used as a tactical weapon, plaintiff’s attorneys often engage in open-ended
“fishing expeditions” to burden defendants with costly discovery
requests in the hope of forcing a quick settlement.271 Discovery
abuse is one of the biggest causes for delay and congestion in the
judicial system and by some estimates, discovery costs now account for roughly 50% to 90% of the total costs for a case.272
E. Trade Secrets In Germany
“Germany is the forum of choice for European patent and
trade secret litigation, but discovery there can be limited.”273 As a
civil law country, Germany provides for numerous provisions on
protecting trade secrets, which can be found in a variety of different codes and are scattered throughout German law.274 The most
relevant provision for trade secret law is Section 17 of the Act
Against Unfair Competition,275 which belongs under criminal law,
but also serves as the basis for civil law claims.276 There is no statutory definition of a trade secret under German law, but:
[I]t is generally accepted that trade secrets incorporate (1) all information connected to the business
9008/Library/The%20State%20of%20Patent%20Litigation%20w%20Ediscovery%20Model
%20Order.pdf.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010).
272
Id.
273
Alexander Harguth & Tamara Fraizer, Navigating Between German and US Discovery
Provisions, LAW360 (Sept. 23, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
270953/navigating-between-german-and-us-discovery-provisions.
274
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at app. 6, 167 available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_appen
dix-6_en.pdf.
275
China’s trade secret law is similarly rooted in its Anti-Unfair Competition Law.
276
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at app. 6, 167; see also Gesetz Gegen den
Unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] [Act Against Unfair Competition] Mar. 3, 2010, BGBL. I
at 254, § 17 (Germany) available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_uwg/
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which is (2) not public knowledge, (3) shall be expressively kept secret for the purpose of economic
interest, whereas (4) the business owner needs to
have a legitimate commercial interest in keeping the
information secret.277
There is also a distinction between trade and business secrets:
trade secrets relate to the commercial section of a business, while
business secrets relate to the technical section of a business.278
However, this distinction does not affect the level of protection
offered because both enjoy the same protections.279
Under German law, trade secrets are not considered to be an
intellectual property right.280 This results in the distinction where
intellectual property rights are “powerful ‘real’ rights whereas
trade secrets are not protected as a ‘right,’ merely non-disclosure
of the secret is protected.”281 Additionally, under German law the
most important provisions protecting trade secrets are in the area
of criminal law.282 Consequently, the owner of a trade secret must
rely on the public prosecutor in most cases, which can take a while
because the prosecutor acquires the evidence and information himself.283
In Germany, the elements that must be established in order to
commence legal proceedings differ for civil and criminal procedure.284 In civil cases, the application and giving of evidence is of
particular note to this analysis. When filing the application, the
matter in dispute has to be precisely specified in a way so that the
trade secret at issue can be identified.285 German case law can help
the trade secret owner because it provides some assumptions such
as prima facie evidence that may assist him in protecting his trade
secret.286 Additionally, the plaintiff can often force the defendant to
277
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280
281
282
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let him view certain products or documents, which usually arises
from Sections 809 and 810 of the Civil Code and Section 142 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.287 Importantly, Section 811 of the Civil
Code provides that the party demanding the presentation of the
products or documents must also bear the risks and the costs associated with them, and that the party possessing the products or
documents may refuse production until the costs are advanced and
security is provided to mitigate the risks.288 There are also certain
circumstances where the defendant is obliged to provide relevant
information under good faith, provided in Section 242 of the Civil
Code.289 Furthermore, in German procedure a party can only demand documents he is able to specifically identify, and cannot demand categories of documents, like in the United States.290
Preliminary injunctions are also available in German civil cases.
The preliminary injunctions in Germany are fairly swift and a major advantage often associated with them is that there is no oral
hearing.291 Additionally, the plaintiff does not need to fully prove
his case in order to enjoy the benefits of a preliminary injunction,
but only has to provide prima facie evidence in order to demonstrate the likelihood of infringement. 292 However, one downside of
the obtaining a preliminary injunction is that under Section 945 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant can claim damages
against a plaintiff if the preliminary injunction was unfounded, regardless of fault.293 The remedies available in a civil proceeding are:
“cease-and-desist orders, claims for injunctions, claims to render
account of profits for the purpose of calculating damages, claims
for damages, and claims to hand back or destroy the protected information.”294 However, “preliminary injunctions are only available for cease-and-desist claims as well as injunction claims, whereas
287

See id.; see also BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] §§ 809-810 (Ger.);
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damage claims and or claims for information cannot be asserted.”295
Criminal proceedings are often initiated when a trade secret
owner files a complaint with the prosecuting authorities.296 This is
fairly advantageous for the trade secret owner because one does not
have to provide a lot of information because the authorities have
the obligation to gather the evidence themselves.297 One major advantage to this is that the trade secret owner could use the information gathered by the prosecutor in subsequent civil proceedings.298
This is a tremendous advantage for the trade secret owner, especially when the owner does not have a sound means to support his
arguments.299 One of the only drawbacks of this approach appears
to be that it could take the prosecutor some time to investigate all
of the evidence.300
In Germany, civil proceedings in trade secret misappropriation
cases usually last for nine to eighteen months from filing the claim
to the decision in the first instance.301 This timeframe can vary
based on the amount of evidence that has to be taken.302 Under
German procedural law, the costs of the case depend on the value
of the claim.303 The value of the claim is determined by the commercial interest of the case and in typical cases is somewhere between € 100.000,00 and € 250.000,00.304 Trial costs usually
amount from €2.500,00 to € 5.000,00 for the first instance.305 Statutory attorney fees usually range from € 4.000,00 to € 6.000,00
for each party in the first instance.306 Additionally, the costs will
usually shift from the winning party to the losing party.307
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German law also has some important measures in place for protecting the secrecy of the information both during and after the
proceedings conclude. First, under German procedural law, written submissions are only disclosed to the judge and the opposing
party.308 In regards to the oral hearing, the parties can apply to exclude the public from the hearing, which is usually granted if a
trade secret would be disclosed during the hearing and it would
harm the trade secret owner if the general public knew the information.309 The Germans also developed the “Düsseldorf Procedure,”
which allows for the swift securing of evidence all while ensuring
that confidentiality is preserved.310 Under the Düsseldorf Procedure, “the court orders independent proceedings for the preservation of evidence as an interim injunction which is handed to the
defendant together with a statement of claim so there is no chance
to destroy evidence.”311 While this is going on, only the attorneys
and an authorized expert are allowed to inspect the evidence so
that the parties themselves do not get notice of the trade secrets.312
This procedure was originally developed for patent cases, but there
are discussions to extend this type of procedure to trade secret cases because the principles are very similar.313 Although the number
of trade secret cases heard by the German courts each year is unknown, it is most likely lower in number than other intellectual
property rights cases, such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.314
F. Relations Between China and Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of
China have had a diplomatic relationship with each other since
1972.315 Germany regards China as its most important economic
308
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partner in Asia and is China’s leading trading partner in Europe.316
Likewise, “China views Germany both economically and politically
as its ‘gateway to Europe.’”317 China and Germany already have a
strong working relationship in place. For example, the Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (“GIZ”) is an international enterprise owned by the German Federal Government,
which promotes Germany’s objectives in international cooperation
for sustainable development.318 The GIZ has been active in China
for more than twenty-five years.319 In January of 2000, representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China signed the German–Chinese Agreement on the Exchange and Cooperation in Legal Matters.320 This agreement
served as the legal basis for the expansion and intensification of the
mutual relationship between China and Germany in legal matters,
and later merged into the German-Chinese Dialogue on the Rule of
Law.321 This serves as a foundation for the cooperation between
both countries and an annual symposium has been held since its
inception in 2000.322 Notably, the eighth symposium held in Munich in 2008 focused on the effective protection of intellectual
property and the tenth symposium held in Berlin in 2010 focused
on unfair competition law, which serves as the basis for trade secret
protections in both countries.323
China’s Patent Law is also based on the patent laws of Germany and it has been recommended that China look to Germany to
solve problems in areas of intellectual property, such as utility
model abuse regarding utility design patents.324 Additionally, offic316
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ers in China’s intellectual property agencies also already have
strong ties to Germany. For example, Tian Lipu, the former commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), was a
visiting scholar at the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law in Germany.325
He also researched in the European Patent Office, the German Patent Office, and the German Patent Court on patent laws and system.326 Given China’s already strong ties to Germany, it should not
be difficult for them to change their trade secret system to be more
like the German model.
CONCLUSION
The current state of trade secret litigation is a growing concern
for the private sector and foreign governments. Many companies
are averse to storing their information in China because they are
not confident in the legal protections or the available remedies.327
This in turn tarnishes the global perception of the protections Chinese law affords to intellectual property rights and hurts the Chinese economy by excluding the most innovative technologies. Given the rise in trade secret misappropriation by Chinese nationals
for the benefit of Chinese companies, trade secret owners in the
United States need to have viable and effective methods to enforce
their trade secret rights in China. Trade secret owners have several
concerns regarding the enforcement of trade secret protections in
China. They are primarily concerned ensuring that their trade secrets remain secret during and after court proceedings, the high
burden placed on plaintiffs in trade secret misappropriation cases,
and the remedies available to them, such as preliminary injunchttps://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/1211_china_patent_pa
per.pdf.
325
Tian Lipu, Commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Office,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/ShangHaiIPAdmini/2014-10/17/content_1876017
3.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
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trade secret has occurred, the [Multinational Company] is left with few effective options
under [China’s] current legal system.”).

2015]

BURDENSOME SECRETS

637

tions. These concerns all seem to stem from the overall difficulty in
obtaining evidence in trade secret cases. While China has certainly
taken steps in the right direction with its recent reforms, it still can
use some improvements.
The United States and Germany are regarded among the least
threatening countries to trade secret owners. Both systems have
their strengths and weaknesses, but China should try to adopt some
of the German approaches in trade secret cases, especially when it
comes to gathering evidence. While the discovery process in the
United States is certainly effective, it is not a good fit for China for
several reasons. First, the discovery process is incredibly expensive
and time consuming. The courts of first instance in China open and
close intellectual property cases in six months, which would still
probably be in the discovery stage of similar litigation in the United
States. While the United States has much better preliminary postures for trade secret owners than China, the system suffers from
many drawbacks such as discovery abuse. The two legal systems
are very different and carrying over the discovery process to a civil
law country that is used to be extremely efficient is unlikely to
work.
Modeling reforms after the German approach is a much more
attractive option for China. First, this should be a relatively easy
transition for China because China has strong ties to the German
intellectual property system and has adopted other aspects of Germany’s intellectual property laws. There are striking similarities
between the two legal systems. Both are civil-law systems and both
have their trade secret law grounded in unfair competition law.
Both systems have a very fast docket: China’s being six months,
while Germany’s is nine to eighteen months. Additionally, both
provide criminal and civil avenues that trade secret owners can
pursue in the event of misappropriation. These are strikingly similar as well: both systems allow for evidence obtained during criminal proceedings to be used in subsequent civil proceedings. However, Germany is more effective in several key areas that China
should consider reforming. First, in Germany the prosecutors are
much more open to taking trade secret cases in criminal proceedings. This change is key for China and should not be too difficult to
implement. China should get their police more active in taking
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trade secret cases, which would alleviate a lot of the evidentiary
concerns because they have the resources and authority to do so.
One potential downside is that this change may slow things up a
bit, but that is a risk worth taking.
Second, China should be much more open to granting preliminary motions, such as preliminary injunctions and evidence preservation orders. While there have been recent changes to the Civil
Procedure Law and China is beginning to grant more preliminary
injunctions, it is still too early to tell if this will be a continuing
trend. China could follow Germany’s approach of allowing a defendant to recover damages if the preliminary injunction turns out
to be unwarranted. This would help prevent plaintiffs from frivolously filing for preliminary injunctions and abusing this useful tool.
A final important change China could make is adopting something similar to Germany’s Düsseldorf Procedure. The Düsseldorf
Procedure is a very attractive option because it facilitates the swift
recovery of evidence, while maintaining confidentiality for both
parties. It would alleviate two of the major concerns trade secret
owners have: First, It would allow the trade secret owners to obtain
sufficient evidence to support a claim in the event of misappropriation. Second, it would ensure that if the trade secret owner did decide to file a claim, that his trade secrets would remain confidential
and he would not risk disclosing them to the general public. One of
the main reasons why trade secret owners choose not to litigate is
that the risks of litigation often outweigh any possible benefits because owners face a very real risk of losing the confidentiality of
their information. Adopting the Düsseldorf Procedure will help
alleviate these concerns and will hopefully make trade secret holders more confident in China’s trade secret enforcement.

